Contexte : Dans les systèmes de santé universitaires complexes, les projets d’amélioration de la qualité (AQ) destinés à améliorer les soins et l’apprentissage prolifèrent, mais il existe des différences considérables quant à la manière dont ces projets sont supervisés sur le plan éthique, voire même s’ils le sont. À la suite d’un volume élevé de projets soumis à l’un de nos comités d’éthique de la recherche (CER), mais considérés comme n’étant pas de la recherche et donc non éligibles à un (...) examen, des questions ont commencé à se poser au sein de notre organisation sur la manière dont les dimensions éthiques des projets d’AQ pourraient être évaluées et sur les approbations institutionnelles qui pourraient être nécessaires pour garantir la conformité avec les normes émergentes. Méthodes : Une enquête environnementale à méthodes mixtes a conduit à une analyse quantitative rétrospective des projets d’AQ de notre organisation, associée à des consultations qualitatives approfondies avec le personnel, les médecins et les apprenants de l’ensemble de notre réseau de santé. Les exemptions de CER ont été analysées à l’aide de diagrammes d’exécution afin d’évaluer les volumes de base des projets d’AQ, et des analyses thématiques ont été menées sur les notes de terrain de 133 consultations avec les parties prenantes. Résultats : Au cours d’une période de 34 mois, 117 lettres d’exemption du CER ont été émises pour des projets d’AQ. Les consultations ont mis en évidence la nécessité d’un processus d’évaluation éthique clairement défini pour les projets d’AQ, de structures de gouvernance appropriées et de possibilités d’identifier et d’atténuer les risques. Les personnes interrogées ont également évoqué l’impératif éthique de mener des initiatives d’AQ. Le présent document explique comment ces thèmes ont contribué à l’élaboration et à la mise en place de notre comité d’examen de l’amélioration de la qualité (CEAQ). Conclusion : Depuis 2020, plus de 840 projets ont été examinés par notre CEAQ, dans le but d’atténuer les risques pour les patients, le personnel et les équipes de projet d’AQ dans l’ensemble de l’UHN. (shrink)

Positivism has had a tremendous impact on the development of the social sciences over the past two centuries. It has deeply influenced method and theory, and has seeped deeply into our broader understandings of the nature of the social sciences. Postmodernism has attempted to loosen the grip of positivism on our thinking, and while it has not been without its successes, postmodernism has worked more to deconstruct positivism than to construct something new in its place. Psychologists today perennially wrestle to (...) find and retain their intellectual balance within the methodological, theoretical, and epistemological struggles between positivism and postmodernism. In the process, pre-postmodern criticisms of positivism have been largely forgotten. Although they remain deeply buried at the core of psychology, these early alternatives to positivism are rarely given explicit hearing today. The current piece explores some of the early critiques of positivism, particularly of its scientism, as well as early suggestions to tip the scales (back) in favor ofsapientia(“wisdom”). This third option, largely overlooked within mainstream psychology, is of tremendous value today as it is both deconstructive and constructive relative to the shortcomings of positivism. It avoids the overly reductionistic “trivial order” of positivism, as well as the deeply unsatisfying and disorienting “barbaric vagueness” of postmodernism, while simultaneously embracing important core elements of both currents of thought. (shrink)

While victimization is as old as human history, the notion of victimhood as currently understood is a relatively recent phenomenon. Over the last several decades, the notion of victimhood has been increasing discussed both within academia and the wider public, a trend that has intensified in recent years. In order to gain a clearer vision of this social phenomenon, the current piece follows the lead of Georg Simmel, and identifies a new Simmelian social type—the Victim. After discussing Simmel’s understanding of (...) social types and tracing the origins of the Victim, we examine some of the characteristics of this new social type. While the Victim is best understood on a high level of abstraction—as are all social types—a richer appreciation of the emergence and nature of the Victim will help us to better understand current discussions around victimhood in both academia and the wider public. These philosophical and sociological reflections on the nature of the Victim can thus be of help for better understanding a social phenomenon of considerable importance in today’s world. (shrink)

To the extent that we expect ideographs to be closer to the reality they depict than spoken or written words we are succumbing to the perennial allure of positivistic thinking. Morin powerfully argues that human communication, including ideography, cannot be understood apart from practice, thus removing the positivistic assumption that made the “puzzle of ideography” puzzling in the first place.

ObjectiveHead and neck cancer treatments are known to significantly affect functionality and appearance, leading to an increased risk for body image disturbances. Yet, few longitudinal studies exist to examine body image in these patients. Based on a conceptual model, the current study aimed to determine, in patients newly diagnosed with HNC: the prevalence, level, and course of body image concerns; correlates of upon cancer diagnosis body image concerns; predictors of immediate post-treatment body image concerns; and association between body image concerns (...) and levels of anxiety, depression, suicidal ideation, support, and alcohol and drug misuse.MethodsTwo hundred and twenty-three, newly diagnosed with a primary HNC were assessed using structured clinical interviews and psychometric measures at three, and 6 months after diagnosis. Primary outcome was 3-month, as it was most salient to body image disturbance. Multiple linear regression analyses were conducted on the potential body image predictors, based on the model.ResultsSixty-eight percent of patients with HNC presented some level of body image concerns. Body image concerns at baseline and post-treatment were significantly related and significantly increased from pre- to post-treatment. Immediately post-treatment, 89% presented some level of body image concerns. Correlates of body image concerns in patients with HNC at baseline included: physical symptom burden, difficulties with communication and eating, coping with the cancer diagnosis using denial, suicidal ideation, and having had a past anxiety diagnosis. When controlling for sociodemographic and medical variables, body image concerns in patients with HNC in the immediate post-treatment were predicted by: baseline body image, physical symptom burden, and neuroticism.ConclusionThis longitudinal study helps identify patients more susceptible to experience body image disturbance following head and neck cancer. Clinicians ought to pay special attention to body image concerns upon cancer diagnosis, physical symptom burden, and neuroticism, and may want to target these factors in future preventive interventions. (shrink)

Sleep strengthens memories by repeatedly reactivating associated neuron ensembles. Our studies show that although long-term memory for a medium number of word-pairs benefits from sleep, a large number does not. This suggests an upper limit to the amount of information that has access to sleep-dependent declarative memory consolidation, which is possibly linked to the availability of reactivation opportunities. Due to competing processes of global forgetting that are active during sleep, we hypothesized that even larger amounts of information would enhance the (...) proportion of information that is actively forgotten during sleep. In the present study, we aimed to induce such forgetting by challenging the sleeping brain with vast amounts of to be remembered information. For this, 78 participants learned a very large number of 640 word-pairs interspersed with periods of quiet awake rest over the course of an entire day and then either slept or stayed awake during the night. Recall was tested after another night of regular sleep. Results revealed comparable retention rates between the sleep and wake groups. Although this null-effect can be reconciled with the concept of limited capacities available for sleep-dependent consolidation, it contradicts our hypothesis that sleep would increase forgetting compared to the wake group. Additional exploratory analyses relying on equivalence testing and Bayesian statistics reveal that there is evidence against sleep having a detrimental effect on the retention of declarative memory at high information loads. We argue that forgetting occurs in both wake and sleep states through different mechanisms, i.e., through increased interference and through global synaptic downscaling, respectively. Both of these processes might scale similarly with information load. (shrink)

Inhalt: O. Poggeler: Vorwort - Publikationen des Hegel-Archivs (Bochum) - Publications du Centre de Recherche et de Documentation sur Hegel et sur Marx (Poitiers) - G. Planty-Bonjour: In memoriam Claude Bruaire - Die Lehren der Geschichte: J. D'Hondt: Les lecons hegeliennes de l'histoire - N. Waszek: Weltgeschichte und Zeitgeschehen. Hegels Lekture des Globe - B. Bourgeois: Hegel et la deraison dans l'histoire - D. Souche-Dagues: La 'fierte' de l'Esprit - Dialektische Logik und Geschichtsmetaphysik: O. Poggeler: Geschichte, Philosophie und Logik bei (...) Hegel - K. Dusing: Dialektik und Geschichtsmetaphysik in Hegels Konzeption philosophiegeschichtlicher Entwicklung - G. Schmidt: Kausalitat oder Substantialitat? - Geschichte der Philosophie und logische Kategorien: M. Riedel: Erster und anderer Anfang. Hegels Bestimmung des Ursprungs und Grundes der griechischen Philosophie - B. Tuschling: Necessarium est idem simul esse et non esse. Zu Hegels Revision der Grundlagen von Logik und Metaphysik - Entwicklung, Geschichte der Philosophie und Evolution: P. Garniron: Hegels Geschichte der Philosophie der Moderne. Eine Untersuchung auf der Grundlage verschiedener Berliner Nachschriften - H.-Ch. Lucas: Kontinuitat, Einheit und das Neue. Uberlegungen zu Hegel und Thomas S. Kuhn - W. Bonsiepen: Der Zusammenhang von Naturrevolution und geschichtlicher Entwicklung in Hegels Berliner System - Anhang: Abkurzungen und Siglen - Literaturverzeichnis: H.-Ch. Lucas und N. Waszek. - Personenverzeichnis. (shrink)

We describe a new class of experiments designed to probe the foundations of quantum mechanics. Using quantum controlling devices, we show how to attain a freedom in temporal ordering of the control and detection of various phenomena. We consider wave–particle duality in the context of quantum-controlled and the entanglement-assisted delayed-choice experiments. Then we discuss a quantum-controlled CHSH experiment and measurement of photon’s transversal position and momentum in a single set-up.

The aim of our introduction is to present the reader with key concepts and paradigms that have been rigorously developed to empirically investigate the dynamics and outcomes of conversational remembering in cognitive research.

We develop a novel solution to the negation version of the Frege-Geach problem by taking up recent insights from the bilateral programme in logic. Bilateralists derive the meaning of negation from a primitive *B-type* inconsistency involving the attitudes of assent and dissent. Some may demand an explanation of this inconsistency in simpler terms, but we argue that bilateralism’s assumptions are no less explanatory than those of *A-type* semantics that only require a single primitive attitude, but must stipulate inconsistency elsewhere. Based (...) on these insights, we develop a version of B-type expressivism called *inferential expressivism*. This is a novel semantic framework that characterises meanings by inferential roles that define which *attitudes* one can *infer* from the use of terms. We apply this framework to normative vocabulary, thereby solving the Frege-Geach problem generally and comprehensively. Our account moreover includes a semantics for epistemic modals, thereby also explaining normative terms under epistemic modals. (shrink)

The text examines the attempt by Jürgen Habermas to renew the tasks of critical theory. The systematic reconstruction of his writings reveals a system of typical functions: a) the rationalization of instrumental and strategic action in the material reproduction of social systems (social technology); b) the analysis of the pathologies in the symbolic reproduction of the world of life; c) the clarification of the cognitive, value and expressive models in the public sphere; d) the unveiling of false representations that dominate (...) the mainstream (critique of ideology); e) sketching out alternatives to the status quo, through the utopia of a non-reified communicative everyday practice. All these functions actualize the Enlightenment project to place the cultural tradition in the service of civil and social progress. This ambitious program, however, must recognize the limitations of critical theory, with respect to the need for consolation and hope of human existence. The dialogue between philosophy and religion, which marks the last decade of Habermas's reflection, should be understood in this light. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to explore the connection between change and the B-theory of time, sometimes also called the Scientific view of time, according to which reality is a four-dimensional spacetime manifold, where past, present and future things equally exist, and the present time and non-present times are metaphysically the same. I argue in favour of a novel response to the much-vexed question of whether there is change on the B-theory or not. In fact, B-theorists are often said (...) to hold a ‘static’ view of time. But this far from being innocent label: if the B-theory of time presents a model of temporal reality that is static, then there is no change on the B-theory. From this, one can reasonably think as follows: of course, there is change, so the B-theory must be false. What I plan to do in this paper is to argue that in some sense there is change on the B-theory, but in some other sense, there is no change on the B-theory. To do so, I present three instances of change: Existential Change, namely the view that things change with respect to their existence over time; Qualitative Change, the view that things change with respect to how they are over time; Propositional Change, namely the view that things (i.e. propositions) change with respect to truth value over time. I argue that while there is a reading of these three instances of change that is true on the B-theory, and so there is change on the B-theory in this sense, there is a B-theoretical reading of each of them that is not true on the B-theory, and therefore there is no change on the B-theory in this other sense. (shrink)

A selection of recent philosophical texts—in Italian translation—dealing with the mereology of material objects and the nature of their boundaries. Introduction by L. Morena. Papers by R. M. Chisholm, P. M. Simons, B. Smith, A. Stroll, A. C. Varzi.

On the surface Kant himself seems quite clear about who is deserving of respect: The morally relevant others are all “rational, free beings” or all “human beings.” It is clear, however, that Kant does not want to identify “human beings” in this sense with members of a particular biological species, for he is explicitly open to the idea that there might be non-biologically human rational beings. Thus, for example he is explicitly open to the possibility of extraterrestrial rational beings, who (...) would not be members of the same biological species as us, but who would, presumably be worthy of respect. And it would seem possible that there are members of our biological species who are not “human” in the morally relevant sense. Given these facts, a Kantian needs to give some account of how we are to recognize who or what counts as “human” in the morally relevant sense. I argue that to be “human” in the morally relevant sense is to have the capacity for morality, and that this involves: (a) the capacity to recognize others as ends rather than merely as means and (b) the capacity to enter into relations of ethical community with us. I defend a position I name moral reliabilism. According to this position: (a) We have a quasi-perceptual capacity to directly ascribe moral status to various bits of the world around us. I will argue that this capacity is best thought of in Gibsonian terms as a capacity to pick up on certain types of social affordances; morally relevant others have the capacity to engage in ethical interaction with us, and recognizing the humanity of others involves picking up on this capacity. Those beings who are “human” in the morally relevant sense, then, afford interaction based on mutual respect. (b) We should assume as a postulate of practical reason that this capacity is reliable (although fallible). (shrink)

R. Feldman defends a general principle about evidence the slogan form of which says that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. B. Fitelson considers three renditions of this principle and contends they are all falsified by counterexamples. Against both Feldman and Fitelson, J. Comesaña and E. Tal show that the third rendition––the one actually endorsed by Feldman––isn’t affected by Fitelson’s counterexamples, but only because it is trivially true and thus uninteresting. Tal and Comesaña defend a fourth version of Feldman’s principle, which––they (...) claim––has not yet been shown false. Against Tal and Comesaña I show that this new version of Feldman’s principle is false. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to investigate the relation between the meaning of a sentence and its truth conditions. We report on a comprehension experiment on counterfactual conditionals, based on a context in which a light is controlled by two switches. Our main finding is that the truth-conditionally equivalent clauses (i) "switch A or switch B is down" and (ii) "switch A and switch B are not both up" make different semantic contributions when embedded in a conditional antecedent. (...) Assuming compositionality, this means that (i) and (ii) differ in meaning, which implies that the meaning of a sentential clause cannot be identified with its truth conditions. We show that our data have a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: in a conditional antecedent, (i) introduces two distinct assumptions, while (ii) introduces only one. Independently of the complications stemming from disjunctive antecedents, our results also challenge analyses of counterfactuals in terms of minimal change from the actual state of affairs: we show that such analyses cannot account for our findings, regardless of what changes are considered minimal. (shrink)

This article investigates Hegel's later theory of perception and cognition, identifying and analysing its general assumptions about the relation among the mind's activities. These often unremarked upon assumptions, I claim, continue to underwrite recent interpretive controversies. I demonstrate how a correct understanding of such assumptions points us toward an alternative interpretation of Hegel's model of the mind. I argue that this new model changes how we understand (a) Hegel's later notion of ‘non-conceptual content’ and (b) his distinction between human and (...) animal minds—two areas that constitute the fault line dividing interpretations of late Hegel. To isolate the relevant assumptions, I use Matthew Boyle's influential conceptual distinction between ‘additive’ and ‘transformative’ models of rationality. I demonstrate that Hegel himself addresses the basic issues characterizing this distinction and clarify how approaching his work in these terms presents considerable interpretative and conceptual advantages, including allowing us to defend the position that Hegel adopts a ‘transformative’ framework of mind. To support this argument, this paper closely analyses Hegel's treatment of sensation (Empfindung), which has not yet been systematically addressed by scholars. I show how sensation can be best understood as part of Hegel's later ‘transformative’ framework for cognition. I also show how this framework can be extended to other parts of Hegel's theory. (shrink)

When two or more (groups of) researchers independently investigating the same domain arrive at the same result, a multiple discovery occurs. The pervasiveness of multiple discoveries in science suggests the intuition that they are in some sense inevitable—that one should view them as results that force themselves upon us, so to speak. We argue that, despite the intuitive force of such an “inevitabilist insight,” one should reject it. More specifically, we distinguish two facets of the insight and argue that: (a) (...) the profusion of multiple discoveries in scientific practice does not support the inevitabilist side of the inevitability/contingency of science controversy; and (b) the crucial role of background knowledge in scientific inquiry complicates the attempt to interpret the pervasiveness of multiple discoveries in realist terms. (shrink)

Increased productivity may have negative impacts on farm animal welfare in modern animal production systems. Efficiency gains in production are primarily thought to be due to the intensification of production, and this has been associated with an increased incidence of production diseases, which can negatively impact upon FAW. While there is a considerable body of research into consumer attitudes towards FAW, the extent to which this relates specifically to a reduction in production diseases in intensive systems, and whether the increased (...) incidence of diseases represents a barrier to consumer acceptance of their increased use, requires further investigation. Therefore a systematic review of public attitudes towards FAW was conducted, with a specific focus on production diseases in intensive systems. Four databases were searched to identify relevant studies. A screening process, using a set of pre-determined inclusion criteria, identified 80 studies, with the strength of evidence and uncertainty assessed for each. A thematic analysis led to the identification of 6 overarching themes constructed from 15 subthemes. The results demonstrate that the public are concerned about FAW in modern production systems. Concern varied in relation to age, gender, education and familiarity with farming. Naturalness and humane treatment were central to what was considered good welfare. An evidence gap was highlighted in relation to attitudes towards specific production diseases, with no studies specifically addressing this. However, the prophylactic use of antibiotics was identified as a concern. A number of dissonance strategies were adopted by consumers to enable guilt free meat consumption. (shrink)

This paper develops a hermeneutic technology assessment of quantum technologies. It offers a “vision assessment” of quantum technologies that can eventually lead to socio-ethical analysis. Section 2 describes this methodological approach and in particular the concept of the hermeneutic circle applied to technology. Section 3 gives a generic overview of quantum technologies and their impacts. Sections 4 and 5 apply the hermeneutic technology assessment approach to the study of quantum technologies. Section 5 proposes distinguishing three levels in the analysis of (...) the creation and communication of social meanings to quantum technologies: (a) fictions, (b) popularization, and (c) scientific journalism. Section 6 analyzes the results and defines some lines of action to increase social acceptance and trust in quantum technologies. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on quantum technologies by enhancing the reflection on them and their potential, as well as illustrating the complexity of technological innovation and the need to shape it. (shrink)

In this paper I describe a specific emotional reaction to the fact that we will cease to exist, namely existential dread, and I argue that the B-theory of time, according to which reality contains a four-dimensional spacetime manifold and the present time is metaphysically on a par with past and future times, cannot accommodate it. Some may see this as an advantage of the B-theory; some may see it as a problem for the view. My aim is not to argue (...) either for or against the B-theory, but merely to show that it is incompatible with a certain common emotion. The paper is split into three sections. I begin by introducing existential dread. Next, I show how existential dread fits into a widely accepted theory of emotion according to which emotions are intentional states susceptible of being both intelligible and correct, where an emotion is intelligible if, roughly, it makes sense; and is correct if, roughly, it fits its object. The core of the paper is the third section: in that section, I introduce the B-theory of time and I argue that it is incompatible with existential dread. (shrink)

In previous work we gave a new proof-theoretical method for establishing upper-bounds on the space complexity of the provability problem of modal and other propositional non-classical logics. Here we extend and refine these results to give an O -space decision procedure for the basic positive relevance logic B+. We compute this upper-bound by first giving a sound and complete, cut-free, labelled sequent system for B+, and then establishing bounds on the application of the rules of this system.

This paper intends to contribute to the emerging literature on the ethical problems posed by quantum computing and quantum technologies in general. The key ethical questions are as follows: Does quantum computing pose new ethical problems, or are those raised by quantum computing just a different version of the same ethical problems raised by other technologies, such as nanotechnologies, nuclear plants, or cloud computing? In other words, what is new in quantum computing from an ethical point of view? The paper (...) aims to answer these two questions by (a) developing an analysis of the existing literature on the ethical and social aspects of quantum computing and (b) identifying and analyzing the main ethical problems posed by quantum computing. The conclusion is that quantum computing poses completely new ethical issues that require new conceptual tools and methods. (shrink)

The inquiry will attempt to answer several questions about: a) the cognitive status of philosophy according to Kant; b) the possibility of distinguishing philosophy from other forms of knowledge, with particular reference to specifically named scientific cognitions; c) the consequences connected with the necessity of thinking of philosophy in its relation to an ulterior dimension with respect to that of science, which is, according to Kant, the dimension of wisdom. Philosophy, according to Kant, is a rational cognition, yet different from (...) mathematics. Philosophy is a rational cognition from concepts, and therefore makes a discursive use of reason in accordance with concepts. Mathematics is instead a rational cognition from the construction of concepts, and therefore makes intuitive use of reason through the construction of concepts. The construction of a concept implies necessarily the capacity and the possibility of exposing in the intuition the corresponding object and to express it through a representation which is universally valid “for all possible intuitions that belong under the same concept”. It is precisely the fact that it is a cognition that proceeds along the construction of concepts which makes mathematics a stable and certain discipline, accompanied by evident proofs founded upon definitions, axioms and demonstrations that no rational cognition that proceeds with mere concepts can possess. It is for this reason that philosophy, in contrast with mathematics and whatever else is in some manner reducible to mathematics, may not be learned; for the fact that philosophy, understood as a scientific discipline in the same way in which all scientific disciplines are to be understood, really doesn’t exist. Philosophy is not a discipline in the sense in which all the other scientific disciplines are, because philosophy, for Kant, “is a mere idea of apossible science that precisely as an idea of a possible science is nowhere given in concreto”. If one may effectively speak about philosophy as a science, this does not constitute the moment in which philosophy finally reaches completion in itself. What Kant underscores is that at this level philosophy is only a science, that is, knowledge which, as much as it is fundamentally stable and certain, does not succeed in any case in obtaining that which constitutes instead, the most important and irreducible element of philosophy: “the relation of all cognition to the essential ends of human reason”. The philosopher is not for Kant simply a technician of reason, in that his aim is not solely that of ability, the completeness of knowledge and its systematic organisation. Rather, he aspires to something which goes beyond the merely cognitive dimension, and that Kant calls “wisdom”. Even knowing that science is the only available path, philosophy knows also that science cannot satisfy itself. In this sense philosophy presents itself as a science of limits and finds precisely in this determination the difference of all particular scientific disciplines, and, at one and the same time, of all pseudocognitive attitudes which are programmatically presented as independent from and alternative to science. (shrink)

El mercado, como cualquier otro sistema de organización de la vida colectiva, es susceptible de evaluación moral. En las páginas que siguen se examinan las dos vías de fundamentación más comunes y se muestran sus limitaciones. La primera presenta al mercado como un sistema social necesario. lo cual se puede hacer por dos caminos: a) mostrando su superioridad desde cualquier criterio de evaluación, su superioridad incondicional; b) mostrando su carácter necesario, esto es, desprovisto de moralidad. La segunda vía pretende que (...) el mercado es el único sistema compatible con valores morales generalmente aceptados. (shrink)

According to some currents of modern historiography, Galilei's propensity for circular motion would have led him to consider this and not rectilinear motion as “natural motion”; therefore the principle of inertia could not be fully attributed to Galileo, which he would never have formulated. The question of the authorship of the principle of inertia certainly weighs on both nationalistic elements and returns of antigaleleism, while the question of its not explicit formulation as a principle is due to ignorance of the (...) type of organization that Galileo intended to give to the exposition of his physics. The author, after having hinted at possible prodromes of the principle of inertia and having reported the adverse opinions of illustrious historians of science (A. Koyré, I. B. Cohen, P. M. Duhem, P. Rossi, G. Holton), through a careful analysis of the Galilean writings, conducted on the digital versions with the help of text analysis programs, firmly reaffirms Galileo's authorship of the principle of inertia and the consequent principle of classical relativity. (shrink)

We suggest that morbid jealousy falls on the extreme end of a jealousy continuum. Thus, many features associated with normal jealousy will be present in individuals diagnosed with morbid jealousy. We apply Boyer & Lienard's (B&L's) prediction one (P1; target article, sect. 7.1) to morbid jealousy, suggesting that fitness-related life-cycle dimensions predict sensitivity to cues, and frequency, intensity, and content of intrusive thoughts of partner infidelity. (Published Online February 8 2007).

This paper concerns the role of the unconscious in technology. The central thesis is that there exists an experience of non-acceptance and failed incorporation of technology, which (a) does not depend on the technical engineering dimension of the artifact but (b) instead concerns the relationship between the human unconscious and the artifact. This thesis is supported and developed through the analysis of a case study – that is, the creation and development of the first version of Google Glass. The failure (...) of the first version of Google Glass is explained in terms of the non-acceptance of this technology. This paper presents an analysis of users’ experiences and comments as a basis for interpreting the relationship between the unconscious and technology. Their non-acceptance of this technology is explained and further clarified from a postphenomenological point of view, utilizing the concept of “technological uncanny.” The analysis suggests that antimediation can be understood as a form of noise. In fact, as non-acceptance, antimediation directly concerns the relationship between contingency and control. (shrink)

ABSTRACT (ENG) One of the concerns of Greek philosophy centred on the question of how a manifold and ordered universe arose out of the primitive state of things. From the mythical accounts dating around the seventh century B.C. to the cosmologies of the Classical period in Ancient Greece, many theories have been proposed in order to answer to this question. How these theories differ in positing a “something” that pre-existed the ordered cosmos has been widely discussed. However, scholars have rarely (...) made explicit how they differ in style of thought. In the span of four centuries the first deductive arguments of the Eleatic philosophers culminated in the emergence of logical proof and a form of explanation of natural phenomena, which consisted of searching for the simplest and fewest premises and deducting implications. In this paper it will be discussed how, at distinct stages of its development, the deductive thinking informed the solutions proposed to solve the chaos-order problem, that of how an ordered universe has been possible. -/- ABSTRACT (ITA) Una delle più importanti questioni della filosofia greca è stata quella di comprendere come sia stato possibile un universo ordinato a partire da uno stato primordiale. Dalle teogonie del VII secolo a.C. fino alle cosmologie dei filosofi dell’età classica, sono state proposte diverse teorie per dare risposta a questa domanda. Come esse differiscano nel postulare l’esistenza di un “qualcosa” di primordiale che preesisteva all’ordine del cosmo è stato molto discusso. Pochi studiosi, però, le hanno esaminate sullo sfondo della lenta evoluzione del pensiero deduttivo, culminata nella dimostrazione in geometria e in una forma di spiegazione dei fenomeni che consisteva nel cercare semplici premesse e inferire conclusioni. In questo articolo si mostrerà come il lento affermarsi della spiegazione razionale prima, dell’argomento deduttivo e della dimostrazione in geometria poi, abbiano dato forma alle diverse risposte al problema caos-ordine, e in particolare alla domanda su come sia sorto un universo ordinato. (shrink)

The autho r , after pointing out the reasons w h y the debate in the EU and in Spain continue to ignore w hat he calls the radical l y political meaning of the phenomenon of mig ration, tries to a r gue that the conditions and the consequences of the re c o gnition of immigration are a political question ( e v en the political question). He focuses in pa r ticular on the pro b lem of (...) immi g rants ' access to citizenship, to propose, li k e Rubio or Carens, a g radual g ranting (in time and space) but mere l y temporary -based on sta b le residence- of citizenship to immi g rants that is understood as pa r t of a plural multiple and inclus i v e concept of citizenship. (shrink)

Reseña del último libro del filósofo argentino Guillermo Lariguet.

This paper intends to address social robotics from the Actor-network theory (ANT) perspective. Starting from the critique of Seibt’s approach and the distinction between anthropomorphing and sociomorphing, the paper proposes a new methodological approach based on ANT and negotiation concepts. This approach allows us to: a) assume a more symmetrical ontology in which robots are considered as social agents, like humans; b) consider all the interactional elements as of equal importance; and c) overcome the dualistic limit that is often imposed (...) on social robotics studies, i.e., the tendency to consider only the one-to-one relationship, one man-one robot, inside the laboratory. Anthropomorphing and sociomorphing are the results of a negotiation process that cannot be reduced to a series of degrees of simulation, but must be understood as a complex interactional process between many agents and material mediations. (shrink)

The imaginal discs of Drosophila melanogaster, which form the adult epidermal structures, are a good experimental model for studying morphogenesis. The genital disc forms the terminalia, which are the most sexually dimorphic structures of the fly. Both sexes of Drosophila have a single genital disc formed by three primordia. The female genital primordium is derived from 8th abdominal segment and is located anteriorly, the anal primordium (10 and 11th abdominal segments) is located posteriorly, and the male genital primordium from the (...) 9th abdominal segment lies between them. In both sexes, only two of these three primordia develop to form the adult terminalia. The anal primordium develops in both sexes but, depending on the genetic sex, will form either male or female analia. However, only one of the genital primordia develops in each sex, forming either the male or the female genitalia. This depends on the genetic sex of the fly. Therefore, the genital disc is a very good experimental model of how the sex‐determination and homeotic genes — which determine cell identity — interact to direct the development of a population of cells into male or female terminalia. It has been proposed that the sexually dimorphic development of the genital disc is the result of an integrated genetic input, made up by the sex‐determination gene doublesex and the homeotic gene Abdominal‐B. This input acts by modulating the response to Hedgehog, Wingless, and Decapentaplegic morphogenetic signals. BioEssays 23:698–707, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

As it stands, Frege’s semantic theory does not provide sufficient general keys for interpreting assertible sentences at different levels of complexity, such as (a) counterfactual-modal-intensional sentences and (b) extensional sentences. It is possible to devise that general key by adding non-classical parameters such as possible worlds, which allow sentences with a high degree of non-extensional complexity to occupy a trivial place in Tarski’s hierarchy as T-scheme-eligible substitutes. The paper argues that finding these non-false (if true) conditions under which complex propositions (...) can be trivially treated as eligible T-scheme substitutes is not trivial. It is a challenge that requires several consistency improvements to deal with various competing extensions of the predicate “true”. We will conclude that Frege-Tarski’s semantic conception (enriched by non- classical presuppositions), misrepresents that challenge. It distorts the problem we face in daily practice to strengthen our assertion systems, plan successful assertion strategies, and protect our assertions from semantic value reversals. The true challenge for us is pragmatic and cannot confuse (1) complicated scientific and empirical conditions of assertiveness with (2) the rewardable scoring-conditions under which one learns to use sentences in his native language. (shrink)